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Abstract 
This paper develops a dialogic theory of thinking and of learning to think that has 
implications for education. The theory is offered as a contrast to theories that are based on 
both Piaget and Vygotsky. The paper proceeds by unpacking and interweaving three key 
concepts: dialogue, thinking and learning in order to argue that learning to think can be 
understood as a shift in self-identification towards becoming dialogue. This theory is then 
applied to the context of primary classrooms through the analysis of three short episodes of 
interaction. These analyses offer evidence that a dialogic theory of learning to think can offer 
new and valuable insights into classroom interaction with the potential to inform pedagogy. 
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Introduction 
In the centenary conference of the birth of both Piaget and Vygotsky held in Geneva in 1996 
Jerome Bruner gave a keynote in which he claimed that research into how children learn to 
think could all be located on a continuum with Piaget on one end and Vygotsky on the other 
(Bruner, 1996). In 2011, some 15 years later, this still seems to be the case with many articles 
on how children learn to think tracing their intellectual sources either to Piaget or Vygotsky. 
At the same time the assumption apparently shared by both Piaget and Vygotsky, that the 
development of thinking could be adequately described in terms of essentially mathematical 
or logical structures and procedures, has recently been heavily challenged by neuro-science 
research (e.g Damasio, 1994: see Wertsch, 1996 and Wegerif, 1999; 2011, for a more 
detailed account of the rationalist assumptions shared by Piaget and Vygotsky). As Shaun 
Gallagher brings out in a recent paper, the latest cognitive development and neuroscience 
research indicates not only that infants learn to think in the context of relationship and 
interaction but also that their thinking is an aspect of those relationships and interactions and 
cannot easily be abstracted from them (Gallagher, S. in press).  In the light of these 
developments we need a new and different way of conceptualizing thinking and what it 
means to learn how to think. In this paper I sketch out a dialogic theory of learning to think 
which offers a radical alternative to both neo-Piagetian and neo-Vygotskian theories because 
it is entirely described in terms of the quality of relationships without reference to ‘cognitive 
structures’. I progress the argument through a conceptual analysis of three key terms: 
dialogue, thinking and learning. I then illustrate the potential value of this theory for 
understanding how children learn to think with analyses of episodes of classroom 
interactions. 
Part 1: the argument 
Question	  1:	  What	  is	  a	  dialogue?	  	  
Below I unpack the concept of dialogue, outlining 6 key features of a dialogic approach to 
education. 
1)	  Dialogic	  as	  the	  experience	  of	  being	  on	  the	  inside	  of	  dialogues	  
When we think of dialogues we probably think of empirical dialogues that occur at a certain 
place and time between particular people. In doing this we are looking at dialogues as if from 
the outside.  But dialogues also have an inside. On the inside of the dialogue we might be 
talking about people who are not present, distant places and past or future events. From the 
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outside dialogues are always situated in space and time but when lived from the inside 
dialogues establish their own space and time. This is what distinguishes a dialogue from an 
interaction. Robots can interact but their interactions remains in external space. When 
humans enter into dialogue there is a new space of meaning that opens up between them and 
includes them within it.  
The distinction between taking an external view of dialogues and an internal view is so 
obviously a part of human experience that it hardly needs justification. It is at the heart of all 
theories that could be called dialogic. Socrates, for example, distinguishes between living 
words that are carried on the warm breath of relationships and the dead words of written 
accounts that are like seeds left on flagstones in the sun (Plato, 2006). This distinction is 
picked up by Paul in the New Testament in the resonant phrase ‘the letter kills but the spirit 
brings life’ (New Testament, 2 Cor 3:6) and is clear in Buber’s distinction between the 
attitude of objectification, ‘Ich-Es’ ( ‘I-it’ ) to the attitude of dialogue ‘Ich-Du’ (‘I-thou’) 
(Buber, 1958). The external ‘objective’ view that locates things in their proper place is 
‘monologic’ because it assumes a single true perspective. The internal view that takes the 
other seriously is ‘dialogic’ because from this perspective meaning always assumes at least 
two perspectives at once so it is reason through and across difference (‘dia’ from the Greek is 
mostly translated as ‘through or across’ so ‘dialogic’ could be translated as something like 
‘logic across difference’ or perhaps as meaning emerging from the interplay of different 
perspectives).  
2)	  Dialogic	  Space	  
I first found the term Dialogic Space useful when trying to answer the question why some 
groups of children were more successful in solving reasoning test problems than others. The 
more successful groups seemed to be listening to each other, asking each other for help and 
changing their minds as a result of seeing the problem as if through the eyes of the others. In 
less successful groups children related to each other differently either competing as 
individuals to see who could get the right answer or not challenging or criticising each other 
in order to maintain group solidarity.  The	  term	  ‘space’	  here	  is	  a	  metaphor	  and	  metaphors	  can	  be	  misleading.	  It	  could	  equally	  be	  called	  ‘Dialogic	  Time’	  or,	  in	  Bakhtin’s	  term,	  a	   ‘chronotope’	  (i.e	  a	   ‘space-­‐time’)	  and	  is	  similar	  to	  Bakhtin’s	  notion	  of	  ‘Great	  Time’	  which	  he	  proposes	  as	  the	  ‘space’	  of	  dialogue	  between	   the	   voices	  of	   all	   times	   and	  places	   explaining	  why	  he,	   a	  20th	   Century	  Russian	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could	   fruitfully	   engage	   in	   dialogue	   with	   voices	   from	   ancient	   Greece	   (Bakhtin,	   1986	  p170).	  The	  metaphor	  of	  ‘space’	  here	  is	  not	  so	  much	  from	  physical	  space	  as	  described	  by	  Aristotle	   and	   Euclid	   but	   from	   the	   use	   of	   the	   term	   ‘space’	   to	   refer	   to	   any	   multi-­‐dimensional	  map	  or	  graph,	  like	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  ‘Search	  Space’	  in	  computing	  which	  is	  the	  set	  of	  all	  possible	  solutions	  for	  a	  search,	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  Hilbert	  Space	  in	  mathematics	  or	  the	  widely	  used	  idea	  of	  a	  Design	  Space,	  which	  maps	  the	  many	  dimensions	  required	  for	  the	  design	  of	  any	  given	  artifact	  (Boden,	  1990;	  Sharples,	  1999).	  The	  main	  difference	  between	  Dialogic	  Space	  and	  these	  other	  kinds	  of	  spaces,	  is	  that	  each	  position	  in	  a	  Problem	  Space,	  Hilbert	   Space	   or	   a	   Design	   can	   be	   completely	   specified.	   The	   specification	   of	   the	   exact	  meaning	   of	   each	  position	   in	   a	   dialogue	  depends	   on	   succeeding	  utterances	   and	   so	   can	  never	  be	  closed	  down	  (Bakhtin,	  1986, 171). In	  other	  words	  ‘Dialogic	  Space’	  is	  more	  of	  a	  dynamic	  continuous	  emergence	  of	  meaning	  than	  a	  static	  ‘space’.	  Perhaps	  the	  term	  space	  is	  misleading	  and	  the	  single	  term	  ‘eventing’	  might	  be	  more	  apposite	  (Badiou,	  1988)	  but	  the	   metaphor	   of	   space	   allows	   us	   to	   speak	   of	   the	   opening,	   closing,	   widening	   and	  deepening	  a	  space	  all	  of	  which	  moves	  prove	  to	  be	  useful	  in	  the	  classroom.	  	  
3)	  Inside-­‐outness	  outside-­‐inness	  of	  dialogic	  One	  important	  defining	  feature	  of	  a	  dialogue	  is	  the	  presence	  of	  the	  other	  on	  the	  inside	  of	  the	  formation	  of	  my	  utterances	  even	  before	  I	  open	  my	  mouth	  to	  speak.	  If	  my	  son	  Danny	  and	  I	  are	  playing	  with	  Lego	  and	  he	  shows	  me	  a	  Roman	  catapult	  he	  has	  made	  and	  I	  say:	  ‘That	  is	  pretty	  cool,	  but	  I	  think	  it	  needs	  something:	  let’s	  try	  putting	  a	  bar	  here	  to	  stop	  the	  arm	  going	  too	  far.’	  You	  might	  think	  it	  is	  obvious	  that	  my	  utterance	  starts	  with	  me	  saying,	  ‘That	  is	  pretty	  cool,’	  but	  even	  as	  I	  framed	  that	  utterance	  Danny	  was	  there	  on	  the	  inside	  because	  I	  was	  speaking	  to	  him.	  The	  words	  ‘That	  is	  pretty	  cool’	  came	  quite	  naturally	  but	  I	  would	   probably	   not	   use	   these	   same	   words	   if	   my	   boss,	   Sir	   Steve	   Smith,	   the	   Vice-­‐Chancellor	  of	  Exeter	  University,	   showed	  me	  his	   latest	   report	  on	  how	   the	  university	   is	  going	   to	   reach	   its	   research	   income	   targets.	   In	   other	   words	   I	   naturally	   use	   Danny’s	  vocabulary	  and	  style	  because	   I	  am	  responding	  to	  him.	   In	  any	  dialogue	  the	  person	  you	  are	   speaking	   to,	   the	   ‘addressee’,	   is	   always	   already	   there	   at	   the	   beginning	   of	   the	  utterance	  just	  as	  you	  are	  there	  already	  on	  the	  inside	  when	  they	  frame	  their	  reply	  to	  you.	  In	  any	  dialogue	  we	  do	  not	  just	  address	  ourselves	  to	  the	  other	  as	  a	  physical	  object	  but	  we	  address	   a	  projected	   image	  of	   them,	  which	   includes	  our	   idea	  of	   how	   they	   are	   likely	   to	  respond	  to	  what	  we	  are	  saying	  (Rommetveit,	  1992;	  Linell	  2009).	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This	  inside-­‐out	  and	  outside-­‐in	  nature	  of	  dialogues	  explains	  why	  education	  is	  possible	  at	  all.	  Bakhtin	  points	  out	   that	   there	   is	   a	  difference	  between	  an	  authoritative	  voice	  and	  a	  persuasive	   voice.	   The	   authoritative	   voice	   remains	  outside	  of	  me	   and	  orders	  me	   to	  do	  something	   in	   a	   way	   that	   forces	   me	   to	   accept	   or	   reject	   it	   without	   engaging	   with	   it	  whereas	  the	  words	  of	  the	  persuasive	  voice	  enter	  into	  the	  realm	  of	  my	  own	  words	  and	  change	   them	   from	  within	   (Bakhtin,	   1981	  p343).	   Education,	   as	   opposed	   to	   training	   or	  dressage,	   always	   requires	   this	  persuasive	  or	  dialogic	   voice	   that	   speaks	   to	   the	   student	  from	  the	  inside.	  The	  addressee	  enters	  into	  the	  very	  beginning	  of	  an	  utterance	  and	  how	  in	  a	   true	  dialogue	   it	   is	  no	   longer	  possible	   to	  say	  who	   is	   thinking	  (Merleau-Ponty, 1968, 
p15 and 113: Merleau-Ponty,1964, p29 and p159).	   
4)	  The	  ‘situation’	  of	  dialogue	  
The socio-cultural movement in psychology has been defined through treating human 
behaviour as situated both culturally and historically (Rogoff, Gauvain and Ellis, 1991).  At 
first glance dialogic theory fits into this situated view easily as meanings are not universal but 
are situated within dialogues. How we interpret the meaning of any utterance, included 
theories, must depend upon the dialogue in which such utterances are located including the 
utterances they respond to and the utterances they might seek to influence in the future 
(Linell, 2009). However not all dialogues are between physically embodied voices. Even 
when the ‘other’ I address appears to be a physical person standing in front of me I may well 
be addressing a cultural voice. For example if I am talking to you about the role of research 
and you use key words that I associate with an Enlightenment view of progress through 
reason then I might find myself engaged in dialogue with that cultural voice while apparently 
engaged in dialogue with you, a concrete person. When Bakhtin writes of voices in dialogue 
as ‘embodied’ he often means embodied in texts or coming out of and reflecting social and 
historical movements and experiences, he does not normally mean that voices are embodied 
in just one physical human being. Indeed his concept of ‘heteroglossia’ suggest that it is not 
possible for words to have simple, single and located meanings as they always carry with 
them echoes of all the other voices that have used the same words before in different ways.  
There is another more serious problem for the idea that dialogues are situated. As well as 
having perhaps a physically situated addressee and cultural voices, utterances in dialogues 
also always address a ‘super-addressee’ (Bakhtin, 1986, p126-7). This superaddressee is 
described by Bakhtin as the ‘witness’ or ‘third’ that is an inevitable part of any dialogue. 
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Bakhtin does not spell this out but the ‘third’ addressee in a dialogue is inevitably present in 
all dialogues simply because I can hear myself speaking. When I talk and hear my own words 
it is as if I am another person listening to them and then I naturally assume the position of a 
witness or ‘third’. Bakhtin makes the point that, as well as seeking to persuade you, my 
immediate addressee, I also seek to engage in dialogue with an ideal listener who could make 
sense of what I am saying even if you cannot. I think this could be seen as stemming from a 
projection of the self as another who listens to the words of the self but can understand and 
judge them as if from an outside position. He points out that in different times this 
superaddressee is imagined differently, sometimes being God and sometimes ‘the future 
community of scientists’ but in every age there is such an ideal as it is an essential part of the 
nature of dialogue. This elaborated cultural image of the superaddressee is an extension, I 
would argue, of the witness position in every dialogue that comes from listening to myself 
speaking as if I was other to myself.  
Dialogues have two sides. Viewed from the outside they are situated in space and time, 
culture and history. Viewed from the inside they can invoke any time and any space and seek 
to engage in dialogue with the unsituated outside perspective of the superaddressee. It is true 
to say that for dialogic theory any particular conception of the superaddressee is in fact 
always culturally and historically situated. However the superaddressee is a universal feature 
of dialogue stemming from the very simple and inescapably real experience of listening to 
my own voice as I speak. It is this mechanism internal to dialogues, which means that 
dialogues are never fully situated on the inside but can seem to escape their situation.  
It is only within dialogues that people come to define and know their situations and interpret 
them. If situation in space, time, culture and history is always constructed within Dialogic 
Space then it follows that Dialogic Space, is, in its essence, not so situated. Dialogic Space is, 
in a sense, the situation of situation. However, this is not the whole story. The true ‘situation’ 
of situation is more paradoxical. The situated outsides of dialogues and the potentially 
unsituated insides of dialogues are always bound up together. There is a mutual envelopment 
between these two perspectives by which I mean to say that meanings within dialogues are 
always within cultural and historical situations but at the same time cultural and historical 
situations are always interpreted and given meaning from within dialogues. The idea that the 
dialogic relationship is one of mutual envelopment between insides and outsides around a gap 
is articulated by Merleau-Ponty as a relationship he calls the Chiasm (1964; 1968). 
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5)	  The	  dialogic	  gap	  
Volosinov, Bakhtin’s close collaborator in the 1920’s, famously wrote that "meaning is like 
an electric spark that occurs only when two different terminals are hooked together", and 
further that: "In essence meaning belongs to a word in its position between speakers; that is, 
meaning is realised only in the process of active, responsive, understanding." (Volosinov, 
1986 p102). Bakhtin repeats this same point even more simply when he writes that meaning 
does not exist in a vacuum but is always a response to a question (Bakhtin, 1986, p168). 
These meanings that arise within relationships as answers to questions include every kind of 
‘thing’ or ‘identity’ including ‘self’ and ‘other’. Understanding the everyday phenomenon of 
dialogue therefore pushes us towards an unusual way of thinking: a way of thinking that takes 
difference seriously.  
It is common to think of reasoning as trying to reach agreement. Leibniz, for example, refers 
to reducing different perspectives to identity (Leibniz,	   1973,	  p	  205)	   and	   this	   tradition	   is	  carried	   forward	   in	   some	   contemporary	   communication	   theory	   where	   the	   need	   for	  achieving	   ‘common	   ground’	   is	   emphasized	   (e.g	   Clark	   and	   Brennan,	   1991). However, 
Bakhtin points out that if we were to reach agreement to the extent that our positions 
coincided then there would be no more flow of meaning. Meaning depends on seeing from 
more than one point of view at once. If we could not see something as if it could be other 
than it is then we could not be aware of it at all. To see a thing only as it is without the 
possibility of it being different from what it is would be the kind of monologic vision that a 
video-camera has, that is to say perception with no meaning. To be conscious is to see as if 
through the eyes of another as well as through one’s own eyes. The difference between self 
and other or, as I prefer to see it, an inside perspective and an outside perspective, is a 
necessary condition for meaning. Dialogic Space therefore requires and presupposes a 
dialogic gap between irreducibly different perspectives held together in a relationship of 
proximity. But in fact the dialogue always continues. People always have irreducibly 
different perspectives on the world because we have different bodies and histories. Even 
when we think that we agree about concepts we inevitably understand those concepts 
differently. This is not to suggest that achieving ‘common ground’ is not important in 
dialogues but that it is one moment in a larger flow of meaning that is more fundamentally 
described as the tension between different perspectives held together in proximity around a 
dialogic gap. If there is no gap then there is no dialogue and if there is no dialogue then there 
is no meaning.  
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6	  Ontological	  status	  of	  Dialogic	  Space	  
Dialogues in education are often discussed in terms of epistemology as a form of ‘shared 
inquiry’ and a way of helping in the ‘collaborative construction of knowledge’ (Wells, 1999: 
Linell, 2009; Mercer, 1995).  I propose that it is also useful to think of dialogues in terms of 
ontology, especially the ontology of Dialogic Space. By using the term ontology I am 
suggesting two things. First that the concept of Dialogic Space is not just an idea but is 
pointing to something real that can help us understand how we think and how children learn 
to think. Science tends to work by hypothesising underlying causal mechanisms and Dialogic 
Space is not different. Secondly, I am suggesting that the aim of education is not simply 
knowledge but ways of being. Dialogic is not simply a way for a subject to know about a 
world out there beyond the subject but it is also about a way of being in the world. Referring 
to an ontological interpretation of dialogic is another way of saying that dialogic education is 
education for dialogue as well as through dialogue in which dialogue is not only treated as a 
means to an end but also treated as an end in itself (see also Matusov, 2009, especially 
Chapter 1 and Sidorkin, 1999). 
 
Question 2: What is thinking? 
Heidegger, in ‘Was heisst Denken?’, an essay sometimes translated as ‘What calls thinking?’, 
begins with the claim: ‘We come to know what it means to think when we ourselves are 
thinking. If our attempt is to be successful, we must be ready to learn thinking.’ (Heidegger, 
1978, p369) Thinking has to be learnt, he writes, but the first step in learning thinking must 
be to unlearn all the nonsense that has been taught about thinking. He writes, for example, 
that ‘Science is not thinking’. He means here that algorithmic accounts of thinking (and of 
science) as facts, linked by logical arguments or as the application of a defined method are at 
best accounts of thinking made up after the event that tell us nothing about what thinking is 
really like. So what is thinking really like? Heidegger does not answer this question directly 
but he replaces it with another question: ‘What calls us to think?’ (Heidegger, 1978, p390).
 
By doing this he is pointing out that while cognitive science has tended to describe thinking 
as if it was a process that we can control, like applying a set of tools to solve a problem, the 
actual experience is much more like being called to think by something beyond us. He writes, 
rather obviously perhaps, that what most calls us to think is that which we find most thought 
provoking. While we can never fully grasp hold of that which calls us to think, the very fact 
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that we allow ourselves to be called by it means that our thinking becomes a kind of pointing 
towards it.  
Levinas accepted Heidegger’s claim that we are called out to think by something beyond us 
but this ‘something’ is not, he claimed, a mysterious abstraction like ‘Being’, as Heiddeger 
had perhaps implied. Thinking begins, Levinas claims, when we are called to explain 
ourselves in the face of real other people. From the very beginning, to be a self, for Levinas, 
is to be a kind of response to others who call us out: they call ‘Are you there?’ and the self 
says: ‘Here I am’ (Le mot Je signifie me voici, répondant de tout et de tous. Levinas, 1978, 
p180) It is in the context of a relationship of responsibility (a need to respond) binding us to 
other people that we are first called to think, in order to justify and explain ourselves to 
others.  
Although Levinas writes a lot about concrete real other people, his account of thinking is 
similar in many ways to Heidegger’s original account. He writes that there is something 
about other people that we can never grasp, their ‘Infinite Otherness’ from us, and it is this 
mysterious and ungraspable otherness of the other that is what most calls out to us. Levinas 
invokes this ‘Infinite Other’ in an ethical context but it can also be seen as an account of how 
we learn to think.  The description of thinking as a kind of response to the call of Being for 
Heidegger become thinking as a response to the call of Infinite Otherness.  
Some might say that Levinas’s idea of the Infinite other seems just as vague and mystical as 
Heidegger’s concept of Being. But actually it is quite a concrete and straightforward idea. It 
is simply another way of saying that I am in a relationship with you but any idea I form of 
you does not fully grasp you because you are more than my images of you. Cognition in 
general always occurs within the context of a prior relationship with otherness in general that 
cognition therefore cannot completely comprehend. In other words there is always an outside 
to our representations, that which we cannot grasp, and it is because of this that Levinas uses 
the term ‘infinite’ in the simple sense of ‘not finite’. The encounter with the face of the 
concrete other, Levinas claims, is an encounter with this Infinite Other that outstrips our 
comprehension and yet calls us to respond. 
Heidegger’s and Levinas’s accounts of thinking can be called dialogic not because they 
locate all thinking in real dialogues between specific individuals but because their accounts of 
thinking do not reduce it to ‘structures’ but assume a context of relationship. 
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1)	  The	  vertical	  dimension	  of	  thinking	  
The idea of teaching thinking implies values and criteria for good thinking. Piaget, for 
example, has a clear account of the vertical dimension of the development of thinking from 
the more concrete and ‘operational’ towards the more abstract and universal. Vygotsky 
follows this vertical account of the development of thinking quite closely just questioning the 
internal mechanism of growth that Piaget proposed in order to give a greater role to culture 
and education (Van der Veer and Valsiner, 1991: Wegerif, 1999: Matusov, 2011). Can a 
more dialogic account of learning to think also offer an account of the vertical dimension of 
the development of thinking that is required by education? 
One possible response to this question from a dialogic or more generally socio-cultural 
perspective might be that there are many different kinds of thinking for different purposes in 
different contexts and so it is not possible to talk about teaching ‘good thinking’ because 
there is no abstract ‘thinking in general’ (e.g Rogoff et al, 1991). This is the implication of a 
situated ‘communities of practice’ approach to learning (Lave and Wenger, 1991). I have 
responded to this possible criticism of the whole idea of teaching thinking elsewhere 
(Wegerif, 2004). Accounts of different contexts of thinking describe the horizontal dimension 
of thinking but in addition to this we need an account of the vertical dimension of thinking in 
order to understand thinking in response to a new event or thinking that cuts across contexts 
in order to criticise or challenge existing practices.   
Bakhtin’s notion of the ‘witness’ position or ‘superaddressee’ in every dialogue is relevant 
for re-constructing the vertical dimension of learning to think within a dialogic theoretical 
framework. In a dialogue we might start just trying to persuade the other person but in doing 
so we end up listening to our own arguments as if from an outside point of view. For example 
in analysing the talk of children in primary classrooms I often see children changing their 
minds in the face of questioning by other children not in fact because they tried to see the 
issue or problem from the point of view of the specific questioner but simply because they 
looked at it again as if afresh from the outside and realized that they had got it wrong. In this 
common move they are stepping back and looking again at their own utterances as if from the 
perspective of an outside witness. 
As outlined above in the section on Dialogue, the superaddressee, although not a physically 
embodied perspective, serves as an influential voice or perspective in all dialogues. Bakhtin, 
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distances himself from a ‘spiritual’ account of thinking which transcends its context, when he 
writes of the superaddressee:  
The aforementioned third party is not any mystical or metaphysical being (although, given 
a certain understanding of the world, he can be expressed as such) – he is a constitutive 
aspect of the whole utterance, who, under deeper analysis, can be revealed in it. This 
follows from the nature of the word, which always wants to be heard, always seeks 
responsive understanding, and does not stop at immediate understanding but presses 
further and further (indefinitely). (Bakhtin, 1986, p126-7). 
It follows from Bakthin’s account of the superaddresee that if you try to pin down this 
position in order to dialogue with it you will find that another superaddressee position is 
automatically generated. Bakhtin did not bring this out but with the benefit of reading 
Bakhtin after reading Levinas we can see that the infinite regress implied by the idea of the 
superaddressee means that it leads to a more cognitive version of the Infinite Other. While 
within a specific culture the superaddressee might take on a particular form which we 
dialogue with, shall we say an image of God, then there will also be a witness or 
superaddressee position generated by this dialogue. In other words if one is open in a 
dialogue and listens closely there is no final position but always a voice from outside the 
consensus with a new perspective asking to be heard. This takes us in the direction of 
Levinas’s Infinite Other, that part of the otherness of the other that can never be contained or 
represented within my words but always outstrips my capacity to understand. But it must be 
emphasized that the cognitive Infinite Other invoked here is not any kind of static thing or 
image or person but simply the name given to an infinite process of questioning. 
This analysis of the implicit infinity in dialogues enables us to understand more clearly how 
children learn to reason. First they are called to explain themselves in dialogues with specific 
others. In the act of explaining themselves they become drawn into a dialogue with a third 
position that every dialogue generates, the position of the super-addressee. This position can 
become blocked as a particular set of rules or criteria, those instantiated in a particular 
community of practice for example, or the children can be drawn further into relationship 
with the Infinite Other. This is where this account drawn together from a combination of 
Bakhtin and Levinas goes beyond the otherwise related account of George Herbert Mead. 
Mead offered a similar account of how children learn to think by being drawn out to see from 
the point of view of others and then the ‘Generalised Other’ who represented the norms of the 
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community (Mead, 1934). The Generalized Other is certainly a superaddressee figure but if 
we engage in dialogue with the Generalized Other a new superaddressee position is generated 
which enables us to question these norms of the community and perhaps revise them. There 
are always voices outside of the community questioning the rules of good reasoning that the 
community upholds and listening to those voices with respect takes us in the direction of the 
Infinite Other.  
Question 3: What is learning? 
Lave and Wenger’s situated account of learning as joining and becoming more central in a 
community of  practice has been influential (Lave and Wenger, 1991). In relation to thinking 
it is misguided in so far as it implies that thinking is always limited by the criteria of good 
thinking found within communities (Lave and Wenger, 1991; Wenger, 1999). This is an 
ethically dangerous idea that is disproved every time we are challenged to think by a voice 
outside of our community. However there is one interesting implication of situated learning 
theory that I would like to borrow and build upon to understand dialogic education better, this 
is that learning should be understood as a trajectory of identity within a social context 
(Wenger 1999, p153).  It has long been clear that learning anything significant changes who 
we are and how we make sense of the world around us. This idea is already found, for 
example, in Piaget’s notion of accommodation. However whereas Piaget’s and even 
Vygotsky’s ideas of learning as the development of the self are abstract, Lave and Wenger 
situate this in a cultural context as becoming a self in a society.  
1)	  Identity	  and	  identification	  	  
Identity sometimes refers to things that do not change much like being British or female or a 
teacher. However, there is also a more shifting ground of identifications, like the way in 
which we might identify with being one kind of person at an office party and then shift to 
identify with being a different kind of person at a family funeral. The way in which Wenger 
and other educationalists are increasingly using the term ‘identity’ to understand an important 
dimension of learning is not so much as a noun but as a verb. The interest here is in the active 
process of identification and why and how learners identify with different self-images at 
different times. This is well summed up in a recent article on identity in learning mathematics 
by Paul Cobb and colleagues: 
We take as our starting point the colloquial meaning of identifying, namely, to associate or affiliate oneself 
closely with a person or group. Our concern is with both how students come to understand what it means to 
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do mathematics as it is realized in their classroom and with whether and to what extent they come to identify 
with that activity (Cobb, Gresalfi and Hodge, 2009). 
2)	  The	  vertical	  in	  learning	  
One problem with the learning as identification with social practices model however is that, 
on its own, it is all horizontal and lacks an adequate account of vertical learning. Learning as 
a trajectory of identity on Wenger’s model can account for how one might learn to be a good 
citizen in a democratic society but it could equally account for how one might learn to be a 
good gang member. It is about how we get socialised into different group norms: it does not 
account for how we might learn to become more aware of our identifications in order to 
question and transform group norms.  
Just as the notion of teaching thinking requires an account of what progress and development 
in thinking look like so, in a similar way, the idea of learning to think cannot be left as a 
neutral account of processes of socialisation but implies a notion of learning to think well. 
The dialogic account of learning to think as being drawn into dialogue with the Infinite Other 
that I have outlined offers the vertical dimension that is required for education and that is 
missing in Wenger’s account and in situated learning theory in general.  
3)	  Identification	  with	  orientations	  in	  groups	  
In a similar way to Paul Cobb’s account quoted earlier, Neil Mercer and I found that shifting 
self identifications seemed crucial to understanding the different types of talk we found in 
small groups in classrooms. Disputational Talk, in which children try to defeat each other and 
be the winner, depends on an identification with a narrow and defended self-image where 
what is seen as ‘self’ is defined against others.  This sort of identity can be found in the 
common phrases ‘I win, you lose’ or ‘winner takes all’. People engaged in Disputational Talk 
are trying to beat each other, they are not trying to learn from each other. Cumulative Talk, 
by contrast, depends on all in the group identifying with the group identity more than with 
their individual identity. They do not want to challenge each other since that might disrupt the 
harmony of the group. In cumulative thinking there is no incentive to challenge ideas or 
explore reasoning, instead people seek to agree with each other to maintain the feeling of 
belonging to the group. We have videos of cumulative groups where different opinions were 
in fact expressed, almost by accident, but were then just ignored by everyone present in order 
to maintain the appearance of unity.  
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As well as cumulative and disputational talk we found a third kind of talk that Neil Mercer 
followed Douglas Barnes in calling Exploratory Talk. Exploratory Talk involves engaging 
critically with each others’ ideas within a shared relationship. The definitions of this by 
Barnes and then by Mercer invoke explicit reasoning (Mercer, 1995: Littleton and Mercer, 
2007). However a experimental study led by Sylvia Rojas-Drummond in Mexico shows that 
teaching exploratory talk leads to improvements in collaborative creative or divergent tasks 
without any explicit reasoning (Rojas-Drummond et al, 2006). This finding implies that what 
is essential to ‘Exploratory Talk’ is not the explicit reasoning. Just as disputational talk and 
cummulative talk can best be defined by the type of identification they imply, so can the 
intersubjective reality referred to previously by the term exploratory talk. I now prefer the 
term dialogic talk since what seems to be most essential to this type of talk is identification 
with dialogue itself. 
 
Identification with the ‘space of dialogue’ was an idea I put forward in 1997 writing with 
Neil Mercer to explain the trajectory of learning towards learning to think in small group talk 
(Wegerif and Mercer, 1997). It was meant as an answer to the question: from what standpoint 
are children able to challenge their own thinking? How is it possible for them to change their 
minds because of what they hear in a discussion? If they are thinking then they are not simply 
identifying with their initial position or their self-interest, nor are they simply identifying with 
the other speaker’s position, although they may be listening carefully. If they are able to 
change their minds it must be because they are identifying in some way with the process of 
the dialogue itself and the ideal of truth that it generates.  
4)	  Combining	  identification	  with	  verticality	  
Both disputational talk and cumulative talk involved identification with limited images, one 
an image of self and the other an image of the group. Dialogic talk however is characterized 
by openness and respect for difference. As described in the first section of this paper, dialogic 
is actually defined by a constitutive dialogic gap or difference. Disputational and 
Cummulative talk are at the same horizontal level, they are just different types of talk 
characterized by different identifications. Identifying with the non-identity of dialogue is at a 
different ontological level taking us in the direction of the vertical.  This account of how 
group thinking improved in our studies suggests a general direction in the development of 
more effective thinking away from identification with limited entities or images, and towards 
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identification with the open and non-identical space of dialogue. In a sense this ideal of 
identification with non-identity is an oxymoron but it is a productive oxymoron pointing us in 
the direction of a practice of reflection capable of dissolving fixed images and assumptions.  
The earlier discussion of the third position in every dialogue and the progression from 
dialogue with specific others through dialogue with projected cultural voices and on to 
dialogue with the Infinite Other explains why identification with the space of dialogue leads 
to better thinking and measurably better problem solving in groups. Identification with 
Dialogic Space is functionally equivalent to identification with being in dialogue with the 
Infinite Other and could perhaps also be described as openness to the other and openness to 
the new. 
Part 2: Classroom illustrations of teaching and learning thinking  
So far I have developed a dialogic theory of learning thinking through overlapping 
explorations of the concepts of dialogue, thinking and learning. In this section I will illustrate 
how this theory can help us understand what we observe in classrooms where children are 
learning to think. I will take three short illustrations from the context of mathematics in three 
different primary schools with different groups of children.  
Example 1: Seeing a pattern in a picture 
I mentioned earlier the extensive empirical investigations I conducted with Neil Mercer and 
others including Lyn Dawes, Karen Littleton and Sylvia Rojas-Drummond into the impact of 
teaching Exploratory Talk. The experimental design used in a number of studies enabled us 
to compare successful talk in the context of solving reasoning test problems with 
unsuccessful talk. Comparative analysis of the successful and the unsuccessful talk of the 
same group of children working together on the same problems helped to reveal what aspect 
of the dialogue really made a difference. Various illustrations and extracts of this analysis 
have been published in different articles and book chapters with the general argument that 
they show that language can be used more effectively as a tool for thinking. In the first 
extract of talk, Elaine, John and Danny are talking about a Raven's problem before our 
intervention promoting exploratory talk. They did not get it right. In the second extract, from 
the test given three months later after they had completed all of the ‘Thinking Together’ 
lessons (Dawes, Mercer and Wegerif, 2004), they succeed in solving the same problem. The 
focus of my analysis is on why they succeed in solving the problem in the post-test condition 
when they failed in the pre-test condition.  
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 Figure 1. Problem A  
 
Transcript extract 1: John, Elaine and Danny: Before talk lessons: Problem A.  
Elaine: No, because it will come along like that (Elaine circles answer 5 )  
 
Transcript extract 2: John, Elaine and Danny: After talk lessons: Problem A. 
 John: Number 5  
Danny: I think it’s number 2  
John: No, it’s out, that goes out look  
Danny: Yeh but as it comes in it goes this  
Elaine: Now we’re talking about this bit so it can’t be number 2 it’s that one  
Elaine: It’s that one it’s that one 
Danny: Yeh 'cos look  
Elaine: 4  
Danny: I agree with 4 (John nods his assent and Elaine circles answer 4)  
 
If you look just at the darker lines running vertically you might think that the answer is 
number five because that continues the pattern for these lines. This (false) conclusion is that 
which the children reached in their initial 'pre-test' attempt. Elaine did not pause to consider 
alternatives or to reach agreement with her group, but circled answer five. That she used the 
word ‘because’ reflects the fact that she was responding to someone else's suggestion, made 
through silent pointing at one of the pictures. In this pre-test condition there was little 
discussion. The children rushed through all the problems given without much talk. After the 
intervention programme consisting of a series of ten Talk Lessons, the three children took 
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more time over the problem. As before, it seems that the pattern of the dark lines is noticed 
and John offers number five as the answer. But this answer is only made as a suggestion. 
Danny puts forward number two as the answer, apparently because he is looking at the 
horizontal pattern of the lighter lines. John explains (through a combination of words and 
pointing) that the vertical black lines have to ‘go out'. Danny in turn explains that it cannot be 
number five because the light lines have to ‘go in’. Each of the two boys has adopted a 
different perspective; John takes the side of the dark lines, Danny that of the light lines. Each 
can see enough to refute the position of the other but this does not produce the solution. 
Elaine then comes up with the answer which combines the dark lines going out with the light 
lines going in, that is number four. Once she has expressed this both Danny and John can see 
that she is right.  
 
The perspectives pointed to by John and Danny, almost certainly help Elaine to leapfrog to a 
synthetic vision that takes their two points of view into account in offering a third. ‘Tools’ 
such as pointing and using words are important here but the actual act of solving the puzzle is 
not verbal but a direct vision that occurs out of the tension created by the two different 
suggestions. This is not a mechanical solution but a creative leap in which Elaine takes on the 
position of ‘witness’ or superaddressee. 
 
Example 2: Commutativity 
This next example has a very similar structure but it is more obviously applied to conceptual 
development in arithmentic. Mathematics education expert Carol Murphy and I, with other 
colleagues at the University of Exeter, put together a project combining Exploratory Talk (or 
Dialogic Talk) and mathematics to see if talking together would help young children shift up 
a level in their understanding of mathematics concepts. We are only halfway through 
analysing the results of the project but the results so far look promising.  
One teacher we are working with, Susan, taught her class of 6 and 7-year-olds the ground 
rules for Exploratory Talk and then asked them to work together in groups of three solving a 
simple form of magical square. They were given the numbers 3, 2 and 1 on cards and asked 





Figure 2 Magic square  
 
In one group we video-recorded two of the group, Jack and Amy, worked industriously 
arranging numbers and counting them out while a girl called Judy just watched them.  
‘Two, three and one’ Jack counted on his fingers, ‘that’s six’. ‘One, three and two’, Amy 
counted on her fingers, ‘six’.  
They were succeeding at the task, finding the way in which the numbers could be used to 
make all the rows and columns add up to the same total but they did not seem to realize that 3 
+ 2 + 1 was the same as 1 + 2 + 3 and the same as 2 + 1 + 3 etc. Judy sucked her finger 
looking on then said: ‘They are all adding up to six, look they are all six’. She said it quite 
loud and they certainly heard her but they carried on counting them out numbers in rows and 
columns as if they had not really understood her point.  
When Susan the teacher came around to this group she praised them for arranging the 
numbers correctly to form a magic square and emphasized the point that Judy had seen, that 
if you use only the three number cards ‘1’, ‘2’ and ‘3’ then the answer is always 6 regardless 
of the order. She concluded by saying, ‘So, there is no need to keep counting on your fingers, 
you know that they add up to six’.  
This group had not been using all the talk ground rules but the collaboration itself seemed to 
spark an insight in Judy and prepared the ground for teaching the concept of commutitivity: 
that 1+2 is the same as 2+1 etc. It is interesting that out of the three children Judy was the one 
least involved in the procedure of the task but was the one looking on. There is an old saying 
‘Two is company, three’s a crowd’. In groups of three two children will often happily support 
each other in doing the task as they see it while one is left out slightly. This knowledge that 
three is an awkward number often leads teachers to be resistant to the idea of grouping in 
threes. But the experience of the Thinking Together project shows that three is the best 
number for developing thinking. The child left feeling a bit spare in the group is often the one 
who challenges the others to think more about what they are doing.  
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Example	  3:	  Invoking	  the	  absent	  addressee	  	  
Above we described how thinking is called forth by the superaddressee or witness. The 
crucial role that the absent addressee can play in precipitating a shift in understanding can be 
seen clearly in some data from an American primary classroomi. 
 
 
In the data a group of four children had been told to make a graph but had not been told how 
to make it. They had been growing plants as a class and had measured each plant’s height 
each day. One of the children, Angelina, wanted to write down all the observation data in 
cells linked to each plant name. She had not really understood how a graph can help display 
information. Julia and Tom argued with her that they should map the height of the plants on 
one axis against the days on the other axis. They argued for a long time even turning the 
graph paper around so that they could literally see it from each other’s point of view. At one 
point in the video it is possible to see that Angelina changes her mind quite dramatically and 
concedes to the argument of the others. How does this happen? She precedes her change of 
mind by listening intently to Julia then turning her head away from Julia a little, as if for a 
moment of private thought, then she lifts her head slowly with a long drawn out ‘Ohhh!’ her 
eyes widen as her mouth opens into the ‘O’ shape which is at the same time a kind of smile.  
Is it the argument that Julia has just given that enables her to see things so differently? Before 
Angelina’s conversion, Will had just said:  
‘That’s what you’re telling them with the graph – that’s why we’re making the graph!’  
And then Julia had added:  
‘We’re saying: “It’s day nineteen – how is it going?”’  
As she said this she turned a little to the side and made an exaggerated welcoming gesture 
with her hand drawing in an imaginary viewer from outside to look at the graph.  
There was something at stake for Angelina in not changing her mind as she had invested time 
in her arguments and she wanted to be right, yet she found herself led, almost despite herself, 
to see Julia’s point of view. The quality of the relationships in the group is crucial to this 
achievement of unforced agreement. The ground rules operating in this group meant that 
challenges were responded to with reasons, not with a breakdown of communication, and that 
changes of mind were possible (although this was touch and go at times as they got quite 
angry with each other).  
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It seems that Angelina’s change of mind here did not stem from any abstract logic so much as 
from a shift in perspective to see the graph from a projected future point of view – the point 
of view of the future viewer of the graph referred to and brought into the discussion by Julia 
and Will. This change of mind is preceded by the gesture of drawing in the alternative 
perspective, the future viewer.
iv 
 
Discussion: Towards a dialogic theory of learning to think  
My argument in this paper is that conceptual development is not about experience being 
drawn up into a pre-existing logical system or conceptual system or system of words 
(Vygotsky, 1981: Wertsch and Kazak, 2011) but about experience being organized by seeing 
as if from the perspective of others, both real others and virtual others. I have proposed a 
developmental sequence in learning to think well from responding to the call of real voices, 
to responding to the call of absent cultural voices, such as the projected future reader of a text 
or the Generalised Other of Mead, on to a relationship with the Infinite Other which is not a 
position so much as a process of questioning and a call to go beyond existing images.  In the 
first two examples of talk in classrooms we saw children being moved on conceptually by 
seeing as if from the witness position whereas in the third the conceptual shift was triggered 
by invoking the perspective of an absent future addressee. Since each virtual witness and 
absent addressee can themselves be questioned generating a new superaddressee position this 
feature of dialogues is a source of an infinite creative potential for seeing things in new ways. 
It might be argued that the concept of dialogic is not very useful because in fact everything is 
dialogic. The structure of consciousness itself is dialogic, if consciousness can be understood 
as seeing as if through others eyes.  There is always more than one perspective or more than 
one voice in play so the idea of monologic is an illusion. This is all true but if monologic, 
which is the ideal of there being only one true representation, is an illusion then it is a very 
influential illusion. In lived reality we experience a continuum between more monologic 
voices and more dialogic voices. The sign that says ‘no walking on the grass’ is a more 
monologic kind of voice than a friend who explains to me that his grass needs time to grow 
and so asks me please not to walk on it today. The first is an outside voice of authority, the 
second a persuasive voice that enters into my world as if the words were my own words 
(Bakhtin, 1986). Similarly some people seem to be more monologic than others. Experience 
in classrooms suggests that this is probably not due to any fixed character traits but to socio-
cultural identifications that can be changed through education. Some shout their views and 
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refuse to listen displaying an intersubjetive orientation that Mercer called ‘disputational’ 
(Mercer, 1995). Others may be more quiet but they agree with ‘what everyone says’ and 
ignore any challenges to this groupthink. Such people display the orientation the Mercer 
called cumulative, again in the context of groups talking together in primary classrooms 
(Mercer, 1995). These are two ways of not thinking well because blocked by monologic 
identifications. In each case strong identification with a limited image, a self image in one 
case and a group image in the other, prevents the openness to the question which is necessary 
for good thinking. Teaching thinking therefore means, amongst other things, drawing learners 
away from over-identification with closed and limited identities (monologics) and to open 
them up to questioning from other perspectives (dialogic). Doing this is moving them on a 
scale from monologism towards dialogism: from identifying with a closed image towards 
identifying with the infinite openness and potential of the process of dialogue itself.  
 
Conclusions 
The examples I gave of thinking breakthroughs in primary classrooms illustrated some 
intersubjective mechanisms for taking thought further. In the first two examples teaching 
ground rules that opened a space of reflection enabled children to step back from each other’s 
ideas and leapfrog them into new insights that combined the ideas of others into a new vision. 
In the third example the children spontaneously invoked the perspective of the absent future 
addressee in order to make sense of what they were doing a prompt a breakthrough in 
understanding. Although each new vision can be partially reified into a concept, a clearly 
defined mathematical concept such as ‘cummutitivity’ in the second example, in fact each 
new concept is also a kind of dialogue that brings different perspectives and different 
experiences together dynamically to talk to each other. Concepts, it turns out, instead of 
closing things down can open up new perspectives as if starting points for a new dialogues 
with new potentials for meaning (Linell, 2009). Cognitive development, which has often been 
described in monologic terms, can therefore be re-conceptualised in a more dialogic way as 
drawing isolated moments of experience up into larger dialogues. This is the development 
that Bakhtin wrote of when he implicitly talked of moving from the ‘narrow time’ of the here 
and now, towards that ‘Great Time’ in which every voice is in dialogue with every other 
voice (Bakhtin, 1986). At the same time this model of teaching and learning thinking has 
useful implications for classroom practice. It suggests teaching children how to question each 
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other and how to constantly invoke the voice of absent witnesses in order to help make sense 
of what they are doing and to grow in insight (Wegerif, 2010 gives many more practical 
illustrations of this approach to teaching thinking). 
The idea of dialogic is not limited to dialogue with this or that image of a specific ‘other’ 
person but can lead us beyond the particular other person into dialogue with infinite 
otherness: that otherness that always outstrips us and that never allows us to say ‘now I know 
the truth so I can stop thinking’. Teaching thinking is drawing learners through relationships 
into a state of being more at home in openness and multiplicity.  Learning to think on this 
model can therefore be seen as a trajectory of identification from initial identification with 
closed images of self and group towards an identification with the radical openness of 
dialogue itself. According to this dialogic theory of learning to think: to learn to think is to 
become dialogue with others; to learn to think well is to become dialogue with the Infinite 
Other.  
When Bruner claimed that everyone was either following Piaget or Vygotsky or adopting a 
position between the two (Bruner, 1996) he was assuming that the key distinction in theories 
of cognitive development was that between a focus on individual mechanisms (mostly neo-
Piagetian) as opposed to a focus on social mechanisms (mostly neo-Vygotskian). In this 
paper I have argued by contrast that the key distinction is between monological theories and 
dialogical theories. Piaget and Vygotsky offered different monological theories of 
development. Using the stimulus of Bakhtin’s notion of the superaddressee I have tried to 
show that a genuinely dialogic alternative account of cognitive development or ‘how children 
learn to think’, is possible. Because this account is not about cognition in the abstract but 
about thinking as an aspect of relationships in context it potentially fits better than either 
Piaget or Vygotsky with the new insights that are emerging from research on the brain (e.g 
Damasio, 1994 and Gallagher, in press).  
This paper offers more of a sketch towards a possible theory than a fully elaborated theory. 
The account of how changing identifications in dialogue towards identification with dialogue 
itself can lead to improved thinking has good empirical support (Wegerif and Mercer, 1998: 
Wegerif et al, 2005). The philosophical argument that learning to think involves responding 
to the call of others and of the Infinite Other is plausible as an extension of arguments already 
widely accepted after their initial articulation by George Herbert Mead (Mead, 1934). 
However this paper is perhaps on weaker ground with the third leg of the argument, which is 
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an account of learning as a trajectory of identity towards identification with dialogue as an 
end in itself. Changing identifications are certainly an important aspect of learning but there 
are other aspects that could equally have been focussed upon. In terms of the two metaphors 
of learning that Anna Sfard (1999) discusses, learning as a trajectory of identification only 
makes use of one metaphor, the metaphor of ‘learning as participation’ while the other 
equally important metaphor of ‘learning as acquisition’ is not adequately addressed. This 
suggests a need for further detailed research exploring how individual skills and dispositions 
change through engagement in different kinds of dialogue and exactly how individual brains 
change and develop through self-identification with different kinds of dialogue.  
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